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APRIL 1964

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Kehler today briefed Ambassadorial Group on latest Thompson-Gromyko talk along following lines:

Thompson presented Gromyko with text of proposal for reunification Berlin and a summary of proposal for an International Access Authority. On latter Thompson noted that IAA would not REPEAT NOT run counter to procedure Gromyko had described during first talk as consistent with GDR sovereignty and that IAA need be no more inconsistent with QUOTE sovereignty UNQUOTE than such international transit arrangements as those made under Montreux Convention or overflight provisions International Air Service Agreement.

Gromyko (while reserving right to extend his comments later) said proposal not frightening to GDR. He said GDR apparently not REPEAT NOT prepared exercising right of further comment, saying GDR to be consistent with serious discussion as Soviet opposition to any international regulation between GDR and GDR. Gromyko described any all-Berlin proposal as internal GDR matter. He said GDR concentration on access was one-sided and

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and offered no chance for negotiations, adding that progress toward unrestricted and unrestricted access agreement is possible if agreement reached at same time as respect for GDR sovereignty.

On Western rights in Berlin, Gromyko said it was essential to change present status which now dates back 17 years. He said USSR would never sign any document which backs occupation rights or favors retention of Occupation regime in West Berlin.

Gromyko described IAA proposal as interference internal affairs GDR. He said West UNQUOTE looks down UNQUOTE on GDR and does not see that under treaties with both German states GDR as well as Allies will assume obligations, including question of access. He reiterated Soviet intention sign peace treaty with GDR without specifying date.

Gromyko then warned that Western threats to use force if Soviets signed GDR peace treaty (which he attributed to Thompson and QUOTE certain American statesmen UNQUOTE) not frightening to Soviets. He concluded this part of exchange by reiterating right of further comment, adding QUOTE we can arrange a date later UNQUOTE.

Thompson regretted negative nature Gromyko's preliminary remarks. He pointed out international servant character of IAA. Thompson stressed West's intention not to recognize GDR but pointed out that IAA proposals ensure no demonstration of this refusal to recognize. Proposals had been framed to avoid friction between GDR and West and to prevent GDR from being tempted bring pressure on West Berlin and access thereto.

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On Gromyko's

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On Gromyko's statement, it was noted that he wished only to be sure Soviets understood that any attempt to limit West's troops from Berlin after conclusion GDR/USR treaty on grounds presence these troops then illegal would result in troops defending themselves. This must not be considered a threat to USSR.

Gromyko then reported his QUOTE disappointment UNQUOTE in US proposals, concentrating in this exchange on Thompson suggestion that plebiscite be held in West Berlin on continued Western troop presence there. Thompson replied that one fact of life is that West Berlin people want Western troops there and that a plebiscite would end any Soviet doubts about this particular fact.

Gromyko concluded with regret at lack of progress and apparent US intent not REPEAT NOT to seek agreement. Thompson shared regret and refused accept any statement that US not seeking agreement. END SUMMARY

Bohlen commented that while there was no give in Soviet position, there was willingness study US papers and keep talks going. He noted Gromyko had used much same language in discussion with Thompson and him in Moscow during April 1960.

Ormsby Gore saw no surprises in Gromyko's response. He said this response consistent with a certain Soviet lack of decision at this time, which would dictate that Gromyko repeat positions and words used in previous years.

Grewe commented that only interesting point was that Soviets did not terminate talks.

Alphand declined invitation to comment as he did after second round.

Kohler summed

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Kohler summed up that we had no other belief than that the necessity of urgency in going in for next round, as tentatively Gromyko now obliged to comment on our proposals.

FOR USRO:

You may draw on Kohler's briefing for MAC presentation to PERSEUS plus one without using comments of others. We would appreciate your particular emphasis on need for security as leaks of specific proposals at this stage are dangerous instead of merely embarrassing or annoying.

If PERSEUS ask for details of IAA you may ^{say} that proposal given Gromyko is US summary of a BOD working paper and that you will request copies for distribution to MAC.

FYI: Department may be able release this document to MAC by end next week. END FYI.

On details of QUOTE reunification proposal UNQUOTE you should explain that this is the QUOTE Proposal for Reunification of Berlin UNQUOTE as given all NATO countries in EER-h of September 16, 1961 with some language changes in first three introductory paragraphs.

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